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Abstract—Currently, most of the online social networks (OSN)
keep their data secret and in centralized manner. Researchers
are allowed to crawl the underlying social graphs (and data)
but with limited rates, leading to only partial views of the true
social graphs. To overcome this constraint, we may start from
user perspective, the contributors of the OSNs. More precisely,
if users cautiously collaborate with one another, they can use
the very infrastructure of the OSNs to exchange noisy friend
lists with their neighbors in several rounds. In the end, they can
build local subgraphs, also called local views of the true social
graph. In this paper, we propose such protocols for the problem
of private link exchange over social graphs.
The problem is unique in the sense that the disseminated
data over the links are the links themselves. However, there
exist fundamental questions about the feasibility of this model.
The first question is how to define simple and effective privacy
concepts for the link exchange processes. The second question
comes from the high volume of link lists in exchange which
may increase exponentially round after round. While storage
and computation complexity may be affordable for desktop PCs,
communication costs are non-trivial. We address both questions
by a simple (α, β)-exchange using Bloom filters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSN) have grown significantly
over the last ten years with billions of active users using a
variety of social network services. OSNs have revolutionized
the way people interact. People join social networking sites
to connect and communicate with their friends in real-time.
They share interests and activities across political, economic,
and geographic borders. As social network sites continue
to develop both in number and size, the service providers
accumulate unprecedented amount of information about OSN
users. As a result, social networks are a valuable data source
for research on information societies. In particular, underlying
social graphs play a key role in understanding how people form
communities, how the OSNs suggest friendship to two users
who do not know each other but have many common friends,
etc. However, social graphs are not published in clear form due
to serious privacy concerns. Instead, they are anonymized in
various forms and published to third party consumers such as
sociologists, epidemiologists, advertisers and criminologists.
Alternatively, social networking sites provide APIs 1 for data
crawlers at limited rates and within privacy constraints (e.g.
only public friend lists are available). Using this method, the
data crawlers can collect friendship information and build a
partial (local) view of the target social graph.
To overcome the constraints set by the service providers,
we can start from user perspective, i.e. the contributors of
1https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api
OSNs. More precisely, if users cautiously collaborate with one
another, they can exchange noisy friend lists (containing fake
friendships) with their neighbors in several rounds to get better
views of the true social graph. Our ideas are based on the fact
that user IDs are public (e.g. Facebook profiles are searchable
[1]) but the friendships are not so, except when a user leaves
his friend list in public mode. Using public user IDs, any user
can claim fake links from himself to the users not in his friend
list.
The aggregation problem in this paper is unique in the
sense that the disseminated data over the links are the links
themselves. However, there exist fundamental questions about
the feasibility of this model. The first question is how to define
simple and effective privacy concepts for the link exchange
processes. The second question comes from the high volume of
link lists in exchange which may increase exponentially round
after round. While storage and computation complexity may
not be big problems, communication costs are non-trivial. We
address both questions by a simple (α, β)-exchange protocol
with or without Bloom filters. To protect true links from
inference attacks, we add fake links which are beta-fraction of
true links. Furthermore, we realize the attenuated propagation
of links via the parameter α ≤ 1.
Basically, we assume that users are honest-but-curious
(HbC), i.e. they follow the protocol but try to figure out
true friendships among noisy friend lists. To preserve link
privacy, each node obfuscates its friend list by adding fake
links originating from itself to a number of nodes not in its
friend list. Then in exchange stage, nodes share only with their
friends a fraction of noisy links they possess.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We introduce a novel private link exchange problem as
an alternative to social graph crawling and centralized
anonymization of data. The problem is distributed and
provides a privacy/utility trade-off for all nodes.
• We present two schemes for (α, β)-exchange protocol:
Baseline and Bloom filter based. We protect the true links
by adding fake links and requiring the propagation prob-
ability of links to be attenuated by distance. We analyze
the advantages and disadvantages of each scheme.
• We evaluate our proposed schemes on various synthetic
graph models and draw a number of critical findings.
The paper is organized as follows. We review the related
work for information dissemination in social graphs, dis-
tributed anonymization, social trust models and Bloom filter
in Section II. Section III briefly introduces key concepts
of Bloom filter and our link exchange model. In Section
IV, we present Baseline (α, β)-exchange that realizes the
exchange model by sending noisy link lists in clear form.
Section V describes Bloom filter version of (α, β)-exchange
with constant complexities and better privacy. We validate
the proposed schemes in Section VI. Finally, we present our
remarks and suggest future work in Section VII.
Table I summarizes notations used in this paper.
TABLE I: List of notations
Symbol Definition
G = (V,E) social graph with N = |V | and M = |EG|
A(G) adjacency matrix of G
D degree sequence of G (column vector)
Diam(G) diameter of G
N(u) neighbors of node u in G, du = |N(u)|
T number of exchange rounds
(v, w) true link between v and w
(v → w) fake link generated by v
Lu(t) set of links possessed by u at round t
Luv(t) set of links u sends to v at time t
∝ uniformly at random sampling without replacement
α fraction of links shared between a pair of nodes
β fraction of fake links generated at t = 0
m number of bits in Bloom filter
k number of hash functions used in Bloom filter
n number of elements in Bloom filter
Bfu(t) Bloom filter possessed by u at round t
Bfuv(t) Bloom filter u sends to v at time t
II. RELATED WORK
Epidemic spreading [15], [12] is the most related to our
work. In [15], Pastor-Satorras et al. study the spreading
of infections on scale-free (power-law) networks via the
susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model [2]. They find the
absence of an epidemic threshold (λc = 0) and its associated
critical behavior when the number of nodes goes to infinity
using mean-field approximation. Moreno et al. [12] provide
a detailed analytical and numerical study of susceptible-
infected-removed (SIR) on Watts-Strogatz (WS) small-world
model and Baraba´si-Albert (BA) scale-free model. WS graphs
with exponentially distributed degrees can be considered as
a homogeneous model in which each node hash the same
number of links. WS graphs have finite epidemic thresholds.
On the contrary, BA graphs with power-law distributed degrees
are heterogeneous and they expose the weaker resistance to
epidemics starting on highly connected nodes.
Giakkoupis et al. [9] introduce a distributed algorithm
RIPOSTE for disseminating information in a social network
that preserves privacy of nodes. Whenever the information
reaches a node, the node decides to either forward the in-
formation to his neighbors or drop it. RIPOSTE uses two
global parameters δ and λ and satisfies differential privacy
by applying Randomized Response Technique (RRT) [6]. Our
work is also a form of information dissemination over graphs
but it spreads a large number of links, not a single item.
Gossip-based protocols [8], [18] aim at providing alter-
natives to network-level multicast with good scalability and
reliability properties. In these protocols, message redundancy
for high reliability is ensured by the fact each member
forwards each message to a set of other, randomly chosen,
group members. Ganesh et al. [8] propose a fully decen-
tralized and self-configuring protocol SCAMP that provides
each member with a partial view of group membership. As
the number of participating nodes changes, the size of partial
views automatically adapts to the value required to support
a gossip algorithm reliably. CYCLON [18] is a protocol
for construction of reliable overlay networks. It is targeted
to overlays that have low diameter, low clustering, highly
symmetric node degrees and highly resilient to massive node
failures. These properties belong to random graphs. CYCLON
employs enhanced shuffling operation in which nodes select
neighbors for cache exchange based on their age.
By exchanging noisy link lists, our schemes are related
to distributed graph anonymization [5], [17]. However, rather
than producing a single global anonymized graph as in [17],
link exchange protocols result in multiple local outputs. In
addition, link exchange operates at finest-grained level (node-
level) whereas previous works consider a small number of data
holders who manage disjoint sets of nodes.
The idea of adding fake links to hide true links appears in a
number of earlier studies, e.g. [16], [14]. Shokri et al. [16]
propose a method for privacy preservation in collaborative
filtering recommendation systems. They develop a model
where each user stores locally an offline profile on his own
side, hidden from the server, and an online profile on the server
from which the server generates the recommendations. Each
user arbitrarily contacts other users over time, and modifies
his own offline profile through aggregating ratings from other
users. The more ratings a user aggregates, the higher privacy
he is but lower accuracy in recommendations. Nguyen et
al. [14] present a centralized graph anonymization scheme
based on edge uncertainty semantics. Fake links are added
to probabilistically hide true links. They consider distance-2
fake links to keep higher utility.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the exchange model and attack
model. Then we review key concepts about Bloom filter.
A. Exchange Model
We consider a distributed exchange model in which each
node possesses his friend list and all nodes participate in the
exchange protocol. We work on the following assumptions
• Assumption 1 The space of node IDs is public. A node
can generate fake links to any node. All friend lists (true
links) are private, i.e. the existence of true link (u, v) is
surely known to u and v only.
• Assumption 2 A node exchanges messages with its
neighbors only. Interacting with neighbors is based on
an intuition of trusted relationships: we trust our friends
more than any stranger.
• Assumption 3 A synchronous model is guaranteed by
round-tagged messages. It means a node prepares the
Fig. 1: Link exchange with α = 1, β = 1/3
message for round t + 1 if and only if it has received
all t-th round messages from his friends.
• Assumption 4 All nodes are honest-but-curious. They
follow the protocol but try to infer true links among noisy
links.
Fig. 1 illustrates the exchange model. At round t = 0 (initial
round), each node u prepare a noisy friend list by adding some
fake links (u, v) (i.e. links from u to some people not in his
friend list). This is feasible because all user IDs are public
(e.g. [1]). For example, node 0 adds a fake link (0,3) and his
noisy friend list {(0,1), (0,2), (0,3)} is ready to be exchanged.
Similarly, the other nodes prepare their noisy friend lists as in
Fig 1. At round t = 1, all nodes send and receive noisy friend
lists from their neighbors. The local views of nodes 0 and 1
at t = 1 are shown in Fig. 1 where the solid lines (resp. the
dashed arrows) are the true links (resp. fake links) known by
the node and the dashed lines represent noisy links received
at the node.
B. Attack Model
We consider honest-but-curious users (nodes) who follow
the protocol but try to infer true links among noisy links. We
propose a simple inference attack based on frequencies of links
arriving to a node. Given a link (v, w) (a true link or a fake
link) arriving to node u, if (v, w) does not exist in u’s local
view, it will be added. Otherwise, its frequency is increased
by 1. At the end of the protocol, each node sorts all links in
its local view by frequency and selects top K links as true
links. How to select the value of K will be discussed later.
By splitting noisy links into two sets of links as above,
the inference capability of each node is evaluated by common
measures [7]: True Positives (TP), True Negatives (TN), False
Positives (FP), False Negatives (FN). As we will see in Section
IV, the parameter α introduces an attenuation effect for link
propagation when α < 1. Given a link e, nodes farther from e
have lower chance of getting this link. This effect adds another
dimension to our privacy model.
Fig. 2: Bloom filter
C. Bloom Filter
The Bloom filter is a space-efficient probabilistic data
structure that supports set membership queries. It was first
conceived by Burton Howard Bloom in 1970 [3]. It is used to
test whether an element is a member of a set and can result in
false positives (claiming an element to belong to the set when
it was not inserted), but never in false negatives (reporting an
inserted element not in the set).
An empty Bloom filter is an array of m bits, all set to zero.
There must also be k different hash functions defined, each
of which maps or hashes some set element x to one of the
m array positions with a uniform random distribution. The
number of elements inserted into the Bloom filter is n. Fig.
2 gives an example of Bloom filter with m = 18, k = 2 and
n = 3. The MD5 hash algorithm is a popular choice for the
hash functions. When an element not in the set w is looked
up, it will be hashed by the k hash functions into bit positions.
If one of the positions is zero, we conclude that w is not in the
set. It may happen that all the bit positions of an element have
been set. When this occurs, the Bloom filter will erroneously
report that the element is a member of the set, also known as
false positives. Fig. 2 shows w as a false positive.
Given the three parameters m, k and n, the false positive
probability is (see [4]).
p =
(
1− (1−
1
m
)kn
)k
≈ (1− e−kn/m)k (1)
The false positive probability decreases as m increases or
n decreases. Given m and n, the probability of false positives
(1 − e−kn/m)k is minimized at k = kopt = mn ln 2 (see [4]).
In this case, the false positive rate p = (1/2)k or equivalently
k = − log2 p (2)
IV. BASELINE (α, β)-EXCHANGE
In this section, we present the main ideas of our proposed
(α, β)-exchange and the improvements using Bloom filters.
A. Overview
As shown in Section III-A, the link exchange protocol is
straightforward. At the beginning of the protocol, all the nodes
agree on the number of rounds T and the two parameters α ∈
[0, 1], β ≥ 0. Then, each node u prepares his own noisy friend
list Lu(0) by setting Lu(0) = {(u, v)|v ∈ N(u)} and adding
βN(u) fake links in the form (u → w) where w /∈ N(u).
At t = 1, each node u makes a noisy list Luv(1) for every
neighbor v so that Luv(1) contains α|Lu(0)| links sampled
from Lu(0). Similarly, node v prepares a noisy list Lvu(1)
for u. All the nodes sends and receives noisy link lists. Next,
each node aggregates noisy link lists by removing duplicate
links (if any) and obtains his local view of graph by Lu(1).
The round t = 1 finishes.
At t = 2, the process repeats: all nodes u makes a noisy
list Luv(2) for every neighbor v that contains α|Lu(1)| links
sampled from Lu(1). They exchange noisy link lists and after
receiving all Lvu(2) from his friends, node u updates his local
view and gets Lu(2). When t = T , the protocol terminates.
B. Baseline Scheme
The idea in the previous section is called Baseline (α, β)-
exchange as all noisy link lists are in clear form. Algorithm 1
shows steps for Baseline (α, β)-exchange.
Algorithm 1 Baseline (α, β)-exchange
Input: undirected graph G = (V,E), parameters α ∈ [0, 1], β ≥ 0,
number of rounds T
Output: noisy local views of graph Lu(T ), u ∈ V
1: // initialization stage
2: for u ∈ V do
3: Fa(u) = {(u→ w)|w /∈ N(u)} s.t. |Fa(u)| = β|N(u)|
4: Lu(0) = {(u, v)|v ∈ N(u)} ∪ Fa(u)
5: // exchange stage
6: for t = 1..T do
7: for (u, v) ∈ E do
8: u : Luv(t) ∝ Lu(t− 1) s.t. |Luv(t)| = α|Lu(t− 1)|
9: v : Lvu(t) ∝ Lv(t− 1) s.t. |Lvu(t)| = α|Lv(t− 1)|
10: u sends Luv(t) to v
11: v sends Lvu(t) to u
12: for u ∈ V do
13: Lu(t) = Lu(t− 1) ∪
⋃
v∈N(u)
Lvu(t)
return Lu(T ), u ∈ V
Given the graph structure G = (V,E), two parameters
α ∈ [0, 1], β ≥ 0 and the number of rounds T . The protocol
takes place in two stages. In initialization stage, each node u
prepares his own noisy friend list Lu(0) by adding βN(u)
fake links in the form (u,w) where w /∈ N(u) (Lines 3 and
4). In exchange stage (Lines 6-13), at round t, each node u
makes a noisy list Luv(t) for every neighbor v that contains
α|Lu(t)| links sampled from Lu(t). The exchange happens on
every relationship (true link). Each node takes the union of all
noisy links he receives before starting the next round.
1) Faster Simulation in A Single PC: For simulation in a
single PC, storing all link lists for all nodes in clear form is
a costly solution. Moreover, the union operation on lists is
time-consuming. We present here a technique to reduce the
memory footprint and processing time using bit sets.
Fig. 3 outlines the idea. We have M ′ = (1+2β)|EG| distinct
links consisting of |EG| true links and 2β|EG| fake links. By
indexing M ′ links from 0 to M ′ − 1, the noisy link list at
each node is stored in a bit set of size M ′. The union of link
lists (Line 13 Algorithm 1) is equivalent to an OR operation
between bit sets. To prepare Luv(t) for link exchange in round
t, node u must recover link IDs in its bit set.
Fig. 3: Fast simulation using bit sets (column vectors)
Fig. 4: Incremental volume for α = 1
We emphasize that indexing links and storing link IDs in
bit sets are only for simulation. In reality, the number of links
are unknown to all nodes, so they must run Baseline or Bloom
filter (Section V) protocol.
For the case α = 1, the exchange volume is reduced further
if each node u sends only “new” links, i.e. the links that do
not exist in u’s list in the previous round. Fig. 4 visualizes this
idea in which “new” links are in shaded region and old links
are in white region. Note that the incremental volume is valid
only for α = 1. When α < 1, the phenomenon of multipath
propagation (Fig. 5) requires both new and old links to be
sampled with probability α.
2) Utility-Oriented Initialization: Baseline scheme in the
previous section lets a node u generate fake links by connect-
ing u to a certain number of nodes not in u’s friend list. This
initialization may make local sub graphs at the final round have
distorted path distributions due to many fake links connecting
faraway nodes. Distorted path distributions reduce the “utility”
perceived at each node. Based on the observation of using
fake links connecting nearby nodes [14], we suggest a utility-
oriented improvement by two-round initialization. We call a
fake link (u→ v) distance-2 link if d(u, v) = 2. For example,
(0 → 3) is a distance-2 fake link while (2 → 10) is not.
Correspondingly, v is called a distance-2 node w.r.t u.
We introduce a new parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] which stipulates
that each node u create γβdu fake links at t = 0 and exchange
α(1 + γβ)du randomly chosen links to each of its neighbors.
Node u collects node IDs and save them in the set IDu. At
t = 1, node u uses node IDs in IDu to create (1 − γ)βdu
fake links. Algorithm 2 implements this idea.
The number of distance-2 nodes that u collects in Line 7 of
Algorithm 2 is α(
∑
v∈N(u) dv−du−2Tri(u)) where Tri(u)
is the number of triangles with u as a vertex. Assuming that
the set Fa0(u) contains no distance-2 links (Line 3 Algorithm
Fig. 5: Multipath link propagation
2). The number of non-distance-2 nodes that u collects is∑
v∈N(u) αγβdv . The expected number of distance-2 links
that u can create is
L2(u) =
(1− γ)(
∑
v∈N(u) dv − du − 2Tri(u))
[
∑
v∈N(u) dv − du − 2Tri(u)] +
∑
v∈N(u) γβdv
L2(u) is a decreasing function of γ. All nodes have the
highest (resp. lowest) number of distance-2 fake links at γ = 0
(resp. γ = 1). The case of γ = 1 reduces to standard
initialization (Lines 2-4 Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 2 Two-round Initialization
Input: undirected graph G = (V,E), parameters α, γ ∈ [0, 1], β ≥
0
Output: each node u issues βdu fake links
1: // t = 0
2: for u ∈ V do
3: Fa0(u) = {(u → w)|w /∈ N(u)} s.t. |Fa0(u)| =
γβ|N(u)|
4: Lu(0) = {(u, v)|v ∈ N(u)} ∪ Fa0(u)
5: // t = 1
6: for (u, v) ∈ E do
7: u and v exchange α-fraction of their links
8: for u ∈ V do
9: u aggregates all links it knows into Lu(1)
10: IDu = {w|w = v1∧w = v2, (v1, v2) ∈ Lu(1)}\{u,N(u)}
11: Fa1(u) = {(u→ w)|w ∈ IDu}
12: s.t. |Fa1(u)| = (1− γ)β|N(u)|
13: Lu(1) = Lu(1) ∪ Fa1(u)
C. Complexity Analysis
Let A be the adjacency matrix of G and D be the column
vector of degree sequence of nodes, the number of links at all
nodes is upper bounded by the following vector, where IN is
the identity matrix of size N .
LU(t) = (IN + αA)
t(1 + β)D (3)
We say LU(t) is an “upper-bound” because LU(t) accepts
duplicate links. More precisely, let LUu(t) and LUuv(t) be
the noisy link lists at node u and for exchange without
removing duplicate links as in Line 13 Algorithm 1. We have
LUu(t) = LUu(t − 1) +
∑
v∈N(u)
LUvu(t), where “+” denotes
multiset semantics. Clearly, Lu(t) < LUu(t).
Note that the number of rounds T can be small because of
the following analysis. We have four simple facts (see Fig. 5)
1) a true link (v, w) is propagated to node u at round t if
and only if min{d(u, v), d(u,w)} = t for α = 1.
2) a fake link (v → w) is propagated to node u at round t
if and only if d(u, v) = t for α = 1.
3) a true link (v, w) is propagated to node u at round t
with probability
∑
pl∈P (u,v)∪P (u,w)
αl for α < 1. Here
pl is a path of length l from u to v or w.
4) a fake link (v → w) is propagated to node u at round t
with probability
∑
pl∈P (u,v)
αl for α < 1.
We consider three cases.
Case 1: α = 1, β = 0 In this case, there is no fake links.
Using Fact 1, we have |Lu(Diam(G) − 1)| = m, i.e. every
node u receives all true links in G after (Diam(G)−1 rounds.
Case 2: α = 1, β > 0 In this case, there are 2βm fake links.
Using Facts 1 and 2, we have |Lu(Diam(G))| = (1+ 2β)m,
i.e. every node u receives all true links and fake links in G
after Diam(G) rounds.
Case 3: α < 1, β ≥ 0 In this case, there are 2βm fake links.
Using Facts 3 and 4, every node u receives all true links (v, w)
in G after T rounds if
T∑
t=1
[(αA)t]vu + [(αA)
t]wu ≥ 1 (4)
and all fake links (v → w) if
T∑
t=1
[(αA)t]vu ≥ 1 (5)
The protocol’s complexity is measured in storage, computa-
tion and communication. Because all links are stored in clear
form, all complexities increase round by round (except the
trivial case α = 0). They are also upper bounded by the total
links in graph, which is (1 + 2β)|EG|. Intuitively, low-degree
nodes will incur lower complexities than high-degree nodes.
However, as t increases, the gap gets narrower. In Section V,
we will achieve constant complexities by using Bloom filters.
D. Privacy Analysis
In this section, we discuss the link inference attacks that
can be mounted by nodes. Each node has knowledge about
the true links connecting itself to its neighbors and the fake
links it creates before the first round as well as the fake links
pointing to it. The remaining links (denoted as Bu) stored at
node u are subject to an inference attack by u. As discussed
in Section III-B, u may mount an inference attack by sorting
links in Bu by weight and picks top-K links as true links.
In Baseline (α, β)-exchange, the ratio of true links over fake
links is 1β . Each user, therefore, can set K =
|Bu|
1+β and divide
Bu into two sets Tu (predicted true links) and Fu (predicted
fake links). The numbers of true positives, true negatives, false
positives and false negatives are (see Fig. 6 for an illustration)
TPu = |EG ∩ Tu| , FPu = |Tu \ EG| (6)
FNu = |EG ∩ Fu| , TNu = |Fu \ EG| (7)
The precision, recall and F1 score are defined as Prec =
TPu/(TPu+FPu), Recall = TPu/(TPu+FNu) and F1 =
2 ∗ Prec ∗Recall/(Prec+Recall).
Fig. 6: Inference attack measures
V. BLOOM FILTER BASED SCHEME
A. Motivation
Baseline (α, β)-exchange has several drawbacks that moti-
vate a better approach. First, all link lists are in clear form,
allowing nodes to store link frequencies for inference attack
(Section IV-D). If we obfuscate link lists, this kind of attack
may be mitigated. Hashing could be a solution. Second,
sending link lists in clear form may incur high communication
cost, especially at high degree nodes. Assuming that all node
IDs are in range {0...232−1}, i.e. each ID needs 4 bytes, each
link is encoded in 8 bytes. Given a link list, a better way to
encode it is to store all links (u, vi) incident to u by {u|{vi}}.
In this way, the message length for a link list can be reduced
up to 50%. In average, each link costs between 32-bit to 64-
bit. Using Bloom filters, the number of bits per link may be
reduced. For example, with k = 4, the number of bits per link
is k/ ln 2 ≈ 5.8.
This section introduces a Bloom filter based approach.
Compared to Baseline approach, it has several advantages and
limitations. Bloom filters, by encoding links in compact forms,
reduce the storage and communication costs. The computation
at each node is also much simpler thanks to logical OR
operation compared to set unions in Baseline.
B. Bloom Filter Based Scheme
Algorithm 3 describes steps of Bloom filter version of
(α, β)-exchange. As for inputs, we add a global false positive
probability p and the number of links |EG|. As analyzed in
[4], the number of hash functions k is set to ⌈− log2 p⌉ (Line
2). The number of bits per link is c = k/ ln 2 (Line 3). The
length of every Bloom filter is m = c.|EG| (Line 4). Then,
each node u initializes its Bloom filter Bfu(0) by hashing all
links in Lu(0) using k hash functions. At the same time, all
nodes send their noisy links Lu(0) to the coordinator who will
gather all links into the list L. This list will be used in the
recovery stage.
In the exchange stage, each pair of nodes (u, v) prepare
and exchange noisy link lists in encoded form Bfuv(t) and
Bfvu(t) (Lines 14-18). Before the next round, each node
aggregates all Bloom filters sent to it by taking the OR
operation. (Lines 19 and 20). Finally, the recovery stage helps
each node to obtain its noisy local view Lu(T ). In this stage,
the coordinator sends to L to all nodes. If we omit the role
of the coordinator (Lines 5,11 and 23), each node u has to
try hash N(N−1)2 possible links against its final Bloom filter
Bfu(T ).
Algorithm 3 Bloom filter (α, β)-exchange
Input: undirected graph G = (V,E), parameters α ∈ [0, 1], β ≥ 0,
number of rounds T , false positive probability p
Output: noisy local views of graph Lu(T ), u ∈ V
1: // initialization stage
2: k = ⌈− log2 p⌉ (see equation (2))
3: c = k/ ln 2
4: m = c.|EG|
5: L = ∅
6: for u ∈ V do
7: Bfu(0) = BloomFilter(k,m,c)
8: Fa(u) = {(u→ w)|w /∈ N(u)} s.t. |Fa(u)| = β|N(u)|
9: Lu(0) = {(u, v)|v ∈ N(u)} ∪ Fa(u)
10: Hash all e ∈ Lu(0) into Bfu(0)
11: L = L ∪ Lu(0)
12: // exchange stage
13: for t = 1..T do
14: for (u, v) ∈ E do
15: u prepares Bfuv(t) = BitErasure(Bfu(t− 1), α)
16: v prepares Bfvu(t) = BitErasure(Bfv(t− 1), α)
17: u sends Bfuv(t) to v
18: v sends Bfvu(t) to u
19: for u ∈ V do
20: Bfu(t) = Bfu(t− 1) ∨
∨
v∈N(u)
Bfvu(t)
21: // link recovery stage
22: for u ∈ V do
23: Lu(T ) = Hash(L,Bfu(T ))
return Lu(T ), u ∈ V
1) Bit Erasure: Because Bloom filters store links informa-
tion in encoded form, we have to simulate the α-sampling
steps (Lines 8 and 9, Algorithm 1).
α-sampling is equivalent to “deletion” of (1−α)|Bfu(t−1)|
elements from Bfu(t− 1). We can perform this operation by
recovering elements in Bfu(t− 1) then explicitly keeping α-
fraction of elements and hashing these elements to an empty
Bloom filter. This approach, however, is costly because the
node must try N(N−1)2 possible links. As a result, an implicit
removal of (1− α)-fraction of elements is needed.
Resetting one bit causes one or several misses (false neg-
atives) and possibly reduces false positives. For example,
resetting the second bit in Bloom filter (Fig. 2) makes x a
false negative whereas resetting the 12th-bit makes both y and
z disappear. Moreover, if the 8-th bit is reset, x becomes a false
negative and w is no longer a false positive.
Let m1 be the number of 1-bits in Bloom filter Bfu(t− 1)
and s be the number of randomly reset bits (s < m1), the
probability of a true positive remaining in Bloom filter is
(1−
s
m1
)k (8)
If omitting the effect of false positives (which is reduced as
illustrated above), the formula (8) is exactly the sampling
fraction α. In other words,
α = (1−
s
m1
)k ⇒ s = m1(1− α
1/k) (9)
We can see that s is a decreasing function of α and k. An
illustration of this fact is shown in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 7: Fraction of erased bits as a function of α and k
Algorithm 4 realizes α-sampling implicitly via bit erasure.
Algorithm 4 Bit Erasure
Input: Bloom filter B, parameter α ∈ [0, 1], number of hashes k
Output: Bloom filter B′ that contains approximately α fraction of
elements in B
1: B′ = B
2: M1 = {i|B(i) = 1}
3: m1 = |M1|
4: s = ⌊m1(1− α1/k⌋
5: randomly reset s bits in m1 positions of B′
6: return B′
2) Bloom Filter Compression: In Algorithm 3, all Bloom
filters stored at nodes and transmitted between nodes are of
length m bits where m = |EG|k/ ln 2. For p = 0.1, we
have k = 4 and m ≈ 5.8|EG|. For p = 0.01, we have
k = 7 and m ≈ 10.1|EG|. For million-scale graphs with
hundreds of millions of links, the length of Bloom filters would
be hundreds of megabytes. This is undesirable for message
transmission although storage and computation are not big
problems. However, we observe that as in Baseline (α, β)-
exchange, not all messages have the length of Θ(EG). Thus,
lossless data compression is a useful tool for Bloom filter
exchange.
Arithmetic coding [11] is such a lossless compression
scheme. Arithmetic coding differs from other forms of entropy
encoding, such as Huffman coding [10]. Huffman coding
separates the input into component symbols with symbol
probabilities approximated by negative powers of two and
replaces each with a code. Arithmetic coding encodes the
entire message into a single number, a fraction f where
0.0 ≤ f < 1.0.
C. Complexity and Privacy Analysis
Thanks to constant sizes of bit arrays and constant time for
OR operations, the total communication cost of Bloom Filter
scheme is constant and the aggregation of noisy link lists is
constant too. However, Bloom Filter scheme incurs an extra
recovery step at all nodes. Each node needs to download the
full noisy link set L from the coordinator. As we confirm in
Section VI-B, the exchange time of Bloom Filter scheme is
much lower than that of Baseline, but the recovery step costs
higher time complexity.
As mentioned in Section V-A, all link lists are obfuscated
in Bloom filters, frequency-based inference attacks may be
mitigated if the set of all links L is revealed to all nodes only
after the final round. The ratio of true links over fake links in
Bloom Filter scheme is almost identical to that of Baseline.
The reason lies in the independence of all links in exchange
protocols. All links have the same probability to be sampled
and sent to neighbors of nodes. Interestingly, Bloom Filter
helps reduce the true/fake link ratio faster than Baseline for
small α (Section VI-A) thanks to its inherent false positives
as well as false negatives caused by bit erasure.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we empirically evaluate the performance of
our proposed schemes on synthetic graphs. All algorithms are
implemented in Java and run on a desktop PC with Intelr
Core i7-4770@ 3.4Ghz, 16GB memory.
Two kinds of synthetic graphs are generated: Baraba´si-
Albert power-law (PL) graphs and Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) random
graphs [13]. Table II lists six synthetic graphs used in our
experiments. Each test case is run 10 times. We abbreviate
the two schemes Baseline (BS) and BloomFilter-based (BF).
We choose α ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0} and β ∈ {0.5, 1.0}.
The default number of hash functions k is 4.
TABLE II: Synthetic graphs
Graph #Nodes #Links Diameter
PL1 10,000 29,990 7
PL2 10,000 49,970 6
PL3 10,000 99,872 5
ER1 10,000 30,076 10
ER2 10,000 50,424 7
ER3 10,000 99,615 5
A. Message Volume and Inference Attacks
We investigate the message volume by the total number of
true/fake links at all nodes after each round t = 1..Diam(G).
These values are normalized by dividing them by N.M.(1 +
2β). We also estimate the inference attacks by the ratio
between the number of true links and the number of fake links.
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show two-y-axis charts. The left y-axis is
for the normalized number of links. The right y-axis is for the
ratios.
Several observations can be made clearly from Figures 8 and
9. First, the number of true/fake links increases exponentially
and converges fast as all nodes reach the round at Diam(G).
For α = 0.25, Baseline does not converge because not all links
are propagated to all nodes. Bloom filter scheme produces
higher number of true/fake links, especially at α = 0.25, 0.5.
For larger values of α, the two schemes almost coincide.
Second, the ratio of true links over fake links decreases round
by round and converges to 12β . In early rounds, the ratios are
lower than 1β . Higher the ratio, higher inference risk of true
links. Clearly, Bloom Filter scheme reduces the risk better than
Baseline for α = 0.25, 0.5 in later rounds.
Fig. 10 displays the distribution of link volume collected
at sample nodes. We sort V by degree and take 100 sample
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Fig. 8: Normalized number of true/fake links and link ratios on ER2
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Fig. 9: Normalized number of true/fake links and link ratios on PL2
nodes. ER graphs which are commonly called homogeneous
graphs show nearly uniform distributions for various values
of (α, β). On the contrary, PL graphs are heterogeneous ones
and sample nodes exhibit much more random distributions.
The inference attack on Baseline scheme (Section IV-D)
is shown in Fig. 11. The average F1 scores for two values
of β are plotted at different rounds of Baseline protocol. We
observe that the scores are quite close to the theoretical values
1/(1+β) (see the dashed lines). On ER2 graph, the inference
attack is more effective at latter rounds and for larger α while
this is not clear on PL2.
B. Bloom Filter Scheme
In this section, we examine the performance of Bloom Filter
scheme. We set the false positive rate of Bloom Filter to 0.1,
0.01 and 0.001 (the number of hash functions k is 4,7 and
10 respectively). Fig. 12 displays the normalized number of
true/fake links by Baseline and Bloom Filter with different
false positive rates. We find that lower false positive rates make
no improvement for α = 0.25, 0.5. Bit Erasure (Algorithm 4)
causes this effect. Lower α means more bits to be erased in
Bloom filters. Consequently, the number of false positive links
and false negative links is amplified round by round for small
α.
We compare the communication complexity of Baseline
and Bloom Filter schemes. Fig. 13 reports the number of
bytes transmitted among nodes after each round in Baseline
and Bloom Filter (with or without compression). Baseline
scheme stores links in clear form, so it incurs exponential
communication complexity. As discussed in Section V-A, we
assume that each node ID cost 4 bytes and a link list of length
l may be stored compactly in 4l bytes. Bloom Filter uses
constant-sized bit arrays, so its communication cost is constant
too. However, each node running Bloom Filter scheme has
to download the full noisy list of (1 + 2β)M links after the
final round to find which links are contained in its bit array.
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Fig. 10: Number of links at sampled nodes (t = 1(.), t = 2(+), t = 3(◦), t = 4(), t = 5(⋄), t = 6(△), t = 7(∗))
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Fig. 11: Inference attacks
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Fig. 12: Normalized number of true/fake links by different false positive rates
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Fig. 13: Communication complexity. Y-axis is the total number of bytes transmitted among nodes (log-scale)
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Fig. 14: Total simulation runtime of all nodes (in millisecond)
The number of bytes in the download step is 4N(1 + 2β)M
bytes for N nodes. The communication cost of the download
step dominates that of bit array exchange. Using bit array
compression (Section V-B2), Bloom Filter scheme reduces the
message size a little bit, especially at early rounds when a large
part of bit arrays are zero bits. For α = 0.75, Bloom Filter
scheme saves the communication cost in the last three rounds
in both ER2 and PL2. For α = 0.25, it is worse than Baseline
in all rounds (except the final round) on ER2 and in the first
four rounds on PL2.
In Fig. 14, we compare the runtime of Baseline and Bloom
Filter simulations in a single PC. In each round, each node up-
dates its link set (count operation) by aggregating noisy link
lists from its neighbors. Then, each node prepares (exchange
operation), for the next round, new noisy link lists sampled
from its link set. At α < 1, the exchange operations cost
an increasing time as more rounds are considered. Higher α
makes the link sampling slower. Only at α = 1, we have fast
exchange operations. In particular, the exchange runtime of
Bloom Filter scheme is constant for α = 1 and is an increasing
function of round for α < 1 due to bit erasure operations. The
count operation of Bloom Filter dominates that of Baseline
because each node has to hash the full link set to recover its
noisy link set at each round.
C. Utility-Oriented Initialization
In this section, we illustrate the benefit of two-round ini-
tialization (Algorithm 2). We set γ = 0.0, 0.5 and denote the
enhanced scheme as D2. Several utility metrics are chosen as
follows.
- Power-law exponent of degree sequence: PL is the esti-
mate of η assuming the degree sequence follows a power-law
nd ∼ d
−η where nd is the number of d-degree nodes.
- Clustering coefficient: CC = 3N∆N3 where N∆ is the
number of triangles and N3 is the number of connected triples.
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Fig. 15: Utility relative errors on PL2 (α = 1.0, β = 0.5)
- Average distance: APD is the average distance among all
pairs of vertices that are path-connected.
- Distance distribution: Distance is the normalized node-
pair shortest-path histogram.
We take 100 sample nodes by degree and compare local
aggregated graphs to the ground truth. The ground truth is
computed by setting β = 0 in Baseline scheme. Fig. 15 shows
the benefit of two-round initialization (D2-0.0 and D2-0.5) on
PL2 graph in early rounds. D2-0.0 and D2-0.5 schemes result
in lower relative errors than Baseline and Bloom Filter in the
first and second rounds, especially by CC and PL metrics.
All schemes are comparable at t = 3, except on CC metric.
Finally, Baseline and Bloom Filter are almost equivalent in
terms of utility and they perform better D2 schemes at t =
Diam(G) on PL, APD and Distance metrics.
VII. CONCLUSION
We motivate the private link exchange problem as an
alternative to social graph crawling and centralized anonymiza-
tion of data. The problem is distributed and provides a
privacy/utility trade-off for all nodes. Our proposed problem
is unique in the sense that the disseminated data over the links
are the links themselves. We present two schemes for (α, β)-
exchange protocol: Baseline and Bloom filter based. Experi-
ments on synthetic graphs clarify advantages and drawbacks of
both schemes. Baseline scheme keeps link lists in clear form,
so its communication cost increases fast. Bloom Filter scheme
incurs lower communication complexity but needs an extra
recovery step in the final round. Both schemes guarantee link
privacy in the range [ 12β ,
1
β ]. In Baseline, the inference attack
based on link counting is not much better than the random
attack. For future work, we plan to investigate asynchronous
models and node/links failures. We also consider community-
based link exchange models in which nodes are gathered in
super nodes and the link exchange takes place among super
nodes only.
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